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NOTES
King v. Phelps Dunbar, LLP.: A Catch-22 for Louisiana Law
Firms
The continuing tort doctrine is a judicially created theory that suspends the
commencement of the applicable prescriptive period if a defendant's violation of
the law is deemed to be continuing in nature. In the employment setting, the
doctrine has been described as a procedural device that modifies the normal
prescriptive period "when the employer's discrimination exists prior to and during
the [prescriptive] period."' There is a caveat to the continuing tort doctrine: courts
will not allow an employee to rely on the doctrine if the employee knew or should
have known that the discrimination against him or her gave rise to a claim against
the employer. This qualification of the continuing tort doctrine thereby requires a
fact-specific inquiry into the particular type of employment.2 A unique situation
arises, then, when an attorney seeks to rely on the doctrine in alleging
discrimination by his firm. In King v. Phelps Dunbar, LLP.,3 the Louisiana
Supreme Court, in a dubious decision, allowed an attorney to avail himself of the
continuing tort doctrine. The decision will result in many Louisiana law firms
rethinking the manner in which they will handle employment decisions with their
attorneys.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In October 1990, Danatus King, an African-American attorney, became an
associate in the commercial litigation section at the firm of Phelps Dunbar, L.L.P.,
("the Firm"). In the following months, several partners repeatedly asked King to
transfer to and perform services in the tort and insurance section of the Firm. King
was advised that the reason the Firm requested the transfer was because of its many
tort and insurance cases in Orleans Parish Civil District Court where the jury pool
was predominantly African-American. Thus, King could "be the Firm's black face
in that venue."4 King rejected each of the transfer requests. In his petition, King
alleges that because of his decision not to transfer, the Firm created a hostile work
environment comprised of unwarranted criticism of his professional competence
as well as diminished work assignments. Finally, on January 20, 1995, three
partners informed King during his associate evaluation meeting that his chance of
becoming a partner at the Firm was nonexistent, and he therefore needed to
consider a career change. Subsequently, King alleged that he could no longer
1. Thelma A. Crivens, The Continuing Violation Theory and Systemic Discrimination: In
Search of a Judicial Standard for Timely Filing, 41 Vand. L Rev. 1171, 1172 (1988).
2. Williams v. Conoco. Inc., 860 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1988).
3. 743 So. 2d 181 (La. 1999).
4. Plaintiffs Petition at 3. King v. Phelps Dunbar, LLP., 743 So. 2d 181 (La. 1999) (No. 96-
3815) [hereinafter "Plaintiffs Petition").
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endure the hostile environment and thereby tendered his resignation on March 10,
1995, effective March 24, 1995. King filed suit against the Firm on March 11,
1996, alleging race discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The trial court sustained the Firm's exception of prescription. Because King's
claim was delictual in nature, the trial court applied Louisiana Civil Code article
3492's one-year prescriptive period' on the basis that prescription began when
injury was sustained on January 20, 1995 (the date of the evaluation meeting). The
fourth circuit court of appeal affirmed the exception of prescription, noting that
King acknowledged in his deposition that he believed he was constructively
discharged at the associate evaluation meeting; thus, prescription commenced on
that date.' The appellate court said that a constructive discharge claim is
subjectively based on the plaintiff's own perception. Therefore, applying the
continuing tort doctrine, which revolves around the defendant's actions, to a
constructive discharge claim would essentially give the plaintiff free rein to decide
when prescription begins. Nevertheless, the Louisiana Supreme Court ignored the
fourth circuit's decision and reversed the exception of prescription. The supreme
court based its ruling on the notion that until King's final day of employment, the
working environment could be considered so hostile as to constitute a continuing
tort7 under Bustamento v. Tucker' and Huckabay v. Moore.9 If the Firm dismissed
King solely because of his race and his refusal to make the requested transfers,
there is undoubtedly a cause of action for employment discrimination. It seems the
Louisiana Supreme Court recognized that this case presented an opportunity to
warn firms that this type of behavior was unlawful. To make its point, though, the
court had to find a way to.sustain King's claim.
This casenote will argue that the Louisiana Supreme Court improperly applied
the continuing tort doctrine to a constructive discharge claim in order to effect a
desired result.'0 In tracing the origins, purpose, and empirical application of the
continuing tort doctrine, this casenote will illustrate that under both Louisiana and
federal jurisprudence, the facts presented in the King case do not warrant such an
application. Finally, the conclusion of this analysis predicts that King, if it remains
the law in Louisiana, will force employers to protect themselves by requiring
terminated employees to leave immediately, instead of affording those who have
been terminated a "grace period" within which to leave."
5. La. Civ. Code art. 3492.
6. King v. Dunbar [sic], 716 So. 2d 104 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1998).
7. King, 743 So. 2d at 188-89.
8. 607 So. 2d 532 (La. 1992).
9. 142 F.3d 233 (5th Cir. 1998).
10. This casenote in no way attempts to argue that Mr. King does not have a valid claim against
the Firm. Rather, this casenote is strictly focused on the belief that Mr. King regretfully brought his
claim after prescription had ran. Consequently, the Louisiana Supreme Court should not have used the
continuing tort doctrine to keep the claim alive because under the facts in the petition, there was no
continuous course of discriminatory conduct.
II. A Catch-22 situation arises after King. A law firm will have one option: to adopt a harsher
policy that requires a terminated attorney to vacate immediately. Otherwise, if a firm continues to
allow a terminated attorney to remain until he or she has acquired a new job, it will be exposing the firm
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II. HISTORY, PURPOSE AND APPLICATION OF THE CONTINUING TORT DOCTRINE
A. In General
In most situations, a plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the acts giving
rise to the cause of action took place within the applicable prescriptive period.
However, the continuing tort doctrine, or the continuing violation doctrine as it is
known in federal jurisprudence, is the exception to the rule. The doctrine is
designed to relieve a plaintiff from establishing that all conduct complained of
occurred within the actionable period if the plaintiff can show a series of related
acts, one or more of which falls within the prescriptive period.. There is a
protective element in the doctrine because the:
core purpose is an equitable tolling notion in that prescription should not
begin to run until facts supportive of a discrimination claim are or should
be apparent to a reasonably prudent person similarly situated; however,
the mere perpetuation of the effects of time-barred discrimination does not
constitute a violation.., in the absence of independent actionable conduct
occurring within the statutory period. 2
Courts first began to apply the doctrine to situations involving a pattern of ongoing
discrimination in which the same person directed similar and continuous acts
toward a specific individual. This pattern scenario resulted in the development of
a "serial violation" test.'I Later, courts expanded the application of the doctrine to
situations where an employer instituted a discriminatory policy that was continually
in effect; for such discriminatory policy situations, courts have now developed a
"systemic violation" test. 4 Finally, some jurisdictions attempted to apply the
doctrine when employees were confronted with the present effects of past
discrimination, but the United States Supreme Court rejected such an application
in United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans.'"
Because continuing torts are the exception to the rule, courts must first analyze
what prescriptive period would ordinarily govern the claim and whether the
plaintiff's factual allegations allow him to avail himself of the equitable tolling
doctrine. In King, the Louisiana Supreme Court was correct in holding that federal
jurisprudence is guiding. Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1006,16 the Louisiana
to potential liability in the interim.
12. Huckabay v. Moore. 142 F.3d 233. 238 (5th Cir. 1998).
13. Edward T. Ellis, Developments in Employment Discrimination Law: Continuing Violations,
ALI-ABA Course of Study, July 17, 1997.
14. Id.
15. 431 U.S. 553, 97 S. Ct. 1885 (1977).
16. La. R.S. 23:1006 (West Supp. 1991) provides, in pertinent part:
B. It shall be unlawful discrimination in employment for an employer to:
(1) Intentionally fail or refuse to hire, refer, discharge, or to otherwise intentionally
discriminate against or in favor of an individual with respect to compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, bicause of race. color, religion, sex, or national
200
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statute prohibiting racial discrimination, is modeled after Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964."7 Therefore, Louisiana courts have routinely looked to federal
decisions for guidance in construing Title VII, and the Louisiana Supreme Court
was correct in doing so in King. ' The federal jurisprudence consistently holds that
Title VII claims are tortious in nature; therefore, Louisiana courts have uniformly
held that the one-year prescriptive period under Louisiana Civil Code article 3492
governs claims filed under La.R.S. 23:1006.1" Specifically, Winbush v. Normal
Life of Louisiana, IncA" held that. in an employment context, claims under
Louisiana's anti-discrimination statute were subject to a one-year liberative
prescription period which begins to run from the date of notification of discharge,
rather than the date of the actual discharge.2'
Williams v. Conoco, Inc.,2 involved a similar fact pattern to King. In the
Williams case, the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on a racial
discrimination claim under Louisiana law in which the plaintiff filed suit more than
one year after she was informed she would be discharged but within one year of the
actual discharge. The Fifth Circuit sustained the defendant's exception of
prescription because prescription began with the notification of discharge. The
court declined to extend the prescriptive period under a continuing tort theory
because the court believed that the theory was qualified by a discovery rule. This
rule holds that even in a continuing violation context, prescription begins when a
party has actual or constructive knowledge of the facts that would entitle him to
bring suit.' In the Williams case, because there were no acts of discrimination
between the notice of termination and the last day of employment, the plaintiff
could not avail herself of the continuing tort doctrine. Additionally, the court
origin; or
(2) Intentionally limit, segregate, or classify an employee in a way which could deprive
an individual of employment opportunities, give a favor or advantage to one individual
overanother, or otherwise adversely or favorably affect the status of an employee because
of race, color, religion, sex. or national origin. Provided, however, that nothing contained
herein shall be construed so as to create a cause of action against any employer for
employment practices pursuant to any affirmative action plan.
D. A plaintiff who has a cause of action against an employer for discrimination in
employment may file a suit in the district court for the parish in which the alleged
discrimination occurred seeking general or special compensatory damages, back pay,
restoration of employment, related benefits, reasonable attorney's fees, and court costs.
La. R.S. 23:1006 was repealed by Acts 1997. No. 1409, 14, effective Aug. 1, 1997.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1994).
18. See Plummer v. Marriott Corp., 654 So. 2d 843 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995); Spears v. Rountree
Oldsmobile-Cadillac Co., 653 So. 2d 182 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1995).
19. • Jay v. International Salt Co., 868 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1989).
20. 599 So. 2d 489 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992); but see Harris v. Home Savings& Loan Ass'n, 663
So. 2d 92, 95 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1995) which stated that Winbush was "erroneously decided.... [W]e
refuse to follow it."
21. Winbush, 599 So. 2d at 491.
22. 860 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1988).
23. Id. at 1307 n.I.
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reasoned that the fact that the employer gave a reasonable termination notice could
not extend te prescriptive period in favor of the plaintiff.
B. Application to King
The Louisiana Supreme Court, in a plurality decision which divided the court
in five separate written opinions, mistakenly ignored the relevant cases interpreting
Louisiana Civil Code article 3492 and instead relied on out-of-context language
from Huckabay v. Moore' and Bustamento v. Tucker' By redirecting focus, the
Louisiana Supreme Court was able to craft a method by which it could apply the
continuing tort doctrine so that King's claim would not have prescribed.2 The
court quoted language from Huckabay, which reasoned that "if a person is
subjected to ongoing harassment, i.e. a continual and a permanent condition of the
workplace, prescription does not begin to run until the damage is abated."" The
first problem with the court's reliance on this statement is that King did not
demonstrate that he was subjected to a continuous hostile work environment in the
time between his associate evaluation meeting and his final day of employment.
Rather, the court merely accepts, in a cursory manner, King's non-detailed
description of that time period in question and assumes it to have been a hostile
work environment based on King's allegations of what had occurred in the past.'
Additionally, the relevant facts of Huckabay serve to illustrate that the
Louisiana Supreme Court's reliance on that case is misplaced. In Huckabay, the
U.S. Fifth Circuit distinguished between actions that fall within the continuing
violation exception and those violations which are discrete adverse actions putting
the plaintiff on notice of the discrimination. There, the plaintiff was a white, county
employee who alleged ongoing racial harassment. The Fifth Circuit applied the
continuing violation doctrine to the daily verbal abuse and the covert unequal
treatment of the plaintiff by the African-American county commissioner. However,
the court held that the plaintiff could not use the equitable tolling doctrine to
preserve his claim in regard to his demotion based on allegedly discriminatory
factors. The court noted that in regard to Huckabay's demotion, it only occurred
once and was "unlike the cumulative effect of the petty annoyances of daily
harassment" because it is the "sort of discrete and salient event that should put an
employee on notice that a cause of action has accrued." 29
24. 142 F.3d 233 (5th Cir. 1998).
25. 607 So. 2d 532 (La. 1992).
26. However, the court's strong approach to find that King's claim had not prescribed goes
against the jurisprudential rule that a decision granting an exception of prescription should not be
disturbed unless it is manifestly erroneous. Harvey v. Dixie Graphics, Inc., 593 So. 2d 351, 354 (La.
1992).
27. Bustamento v. Tucker, 607 So. 2d 532. 542 (La 1992).
28. The court's mere acceptance of King's allegations was because the Supreme Court ruled on
the issue on a mere peremptory exception of prescription and not a full fact-finding hearing.
29. Huckabay, 142 P.3d at 240.
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Thus, analogizing to King's claim, the associate meeting where he was denied
partnership and told that he should make a career change is equivalent to the salient
event of demotion in Huckabay. In fact, King even admitted as much in his
deposition. When asked about the associate evaluation meeting in his deposition
and how he subjectively interpreted it, King responded: "What I understood that
to mean is exactly what they said, that I should consider.., a career change, that
I don't have a future there at Phelps .... I took it as a comment that you are, this
is it for you. You are fired without them saying that you are fired."' 3 The Louisiana
Supreme Court plurality opinions failed to mention King's own words when
relying upon Huckabay. Such an omission appears intentional since there is no
basis upon which to distinguish Huckabay's distinction of salient acts that put
employees on notice with King's own interpretation of the situation as voiced in
his deposition.
As it did with Huckabay, the plurality of the Louisiana Supreme Court also
used language from Bustamento v. Tucker 3' to achieve its desired result, but failed
to apply that language to the facts alleged in King's petition. The court quotes the
Bustamento opinion which held that:
when the acts or conduct are continuous on an almost daily basis, by the
same actor, of the same nature, and the conduct becomes tortious and
actionable because of its continuous, cumulative, synergistic nature, then
prescription does not commence until the last act occurs or the conduct is
abated. 32
However, the King court does not indicate what acts or course of conduct
continued after the associate evaluation meeting on January 20, 1995. That is
because the only allegation in King's petition regarding the time period after the
meeting states that "with each passing day, the employment environment became
more and more hostile."33 Such an ambiguous allegation clearly does not meet a
plaintiff's burden of proof in seeking to utilize the continuing tort doctrine.34
30. King v. Phelps Dunbar, LLP., 743 So. 2d 181,193 (La. 1999) (Knoll, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
31. 607So. 2d532(La. 1992).
32. Id. at 542.
33. Plaintiffs Petition at 4.
34. On the face of King's petition, the last alleged discriminatory act occurred on January 20.
1995 at the associate evaluation meeting. Thus, it appears that this is when prescription began to run.
However, to properly avail himself of the continuing tort doctrine (thus beginning prescription on
March 24, 1995), King should have alleged with particularity whatever discriminatory acts continued
after the associate evaluation meeting that made the employment environment more hostile. Such
allegations could include disrespect from co-workers, failure to be included on assignments previously
given to King. etc. More specific allegations would demonstrate that the tort of hostile work
environment truly was continuous, and not Mr. King's subjective perception of hostility which may in
fact have been the consequences of the previous discrimination. Without such additional allegations,
if a court were to apply the continuous toil doctrine to the facts in King's petition, a court should find
that there was no continuous tort because the associate evaluation meeting was a salient event, putting
King on notice of the discrimination. As such, on the face of King's petition, the proper prescriptive
period should have begun on January 20, 1995.
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In his petition, King's only concrete act of alleged discrimination is the
diminishment of work assignments both before and after the evaluation meeting.
Even if this allegation is accepted as true, however, courts have held that the denial
of work assignments does not constitute a continuing tort. In Calhoun v. Federal
National Mortgage Association,"S the U.S. Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
distinguished an argument based on failure to receive further work assignments by
ruling that diminished work assignments are merely the effects of the
discriminatory act, or "the point at which the consequences of the act become
painful." 6 The First Circuit expounded further on the premise that a curtailed
workload is a continuing effect that does not rise to the level of a continuing
violation in DeNovellis v. Shalala." There, the court said that "purgatory" job
assignments were not in and of themselves discriminatory acts to be considered a
continuous imposition of a hostile work environment. Instead, the court said that
to determine when limitations began, the critical focus is the date that the employer
made the discriminatory decision and communicated the decision to the employee."
IM. KING'S BEST SHOT: THE HARRIS DECISION
In Harris v. Home Savings and Loan Association,39 the plaintiff sued his
employer for age discrimination. Mr. Harris had worked for the defendant
company for 36 years when he was told in October of 1992 that when the company
found a replacement for him, he would be let go. Mr. Harris would have retired in
1996 when he reached the age of 65. The company did not find a replacement for
Mr. Harris until December of 1993, at which time the plaintiff was terminated.' °
Harris filed suit against Home Savings and Loan in March of 1994, and the court
held that the claim was timely. The court refused to accept the defendant's
argument that prescription commenced on the date the defendant company
informed the plaintiff that he would eventually be terminated.4' The Louisiana
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal in King stated that the reason the Harris court ruled
for the plaintiff was because the notice the defendant gave to Mr. Harris was "a
vague and indeterminate notice informing him only that if and when a replacement
could be found he would be replaced."'2 In Mr. Harris' case, the information
communicated to him was distinguishable from a clear two-weeks' notice.
It can be argued that King's situation is similar and therefore should be
decided the same way as Harris. Both plaintiffs were essentially told that their
employers no longer desired their services, allegedly because of discriminatory
reasons. Additionally, both were not given a definite last day of employment.
35. 823 F.2d 451 (11th Cir. 1987).
36. Id. at 455 (quoting Chardon v. Fernandez. 454 U.S. 6, 8. 102 S. Ct. 28, 29 (1981)).
37. 124 F.3d 298 (1st Cir. 1997).
38. ld. at 310.
39. 663 So. 2d 92 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1995).
40. Id. at 94.
41. Id.
42. King v. Dunbar [sic), 716 So. 2d 104. 109 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1998).
2000)
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Nevertheless, there are factual differences that distinguish Harris from King. The
Louisiana Fourth Circuit in King reasoned that "Mr. Harris cannot be blamed for
postponing his litigation with its attendant risk of immediate termination until after
he was actually terminated. "'3 Clearly, then, the notice which Home Savings gave
to Mr. Harris in October of 1992 is that he would be terminated at some time in the
future. Phelps, on the other hand, told King at his associate evaluation meeting that
he needed to seek an enployment change. While the language Phelps used may not
have been as clear as it could have been, it is apparent that Phelps' intention was
to terminate King at the present time." Therefore, the language in Harris that "the
prescriptive period for an alleged improper termination... begins from the date of
termination and not from the date of notification" 3 is inapplicable. The distinction
is warranted because King, unlike Harris, suffered damage as of his date of
notification of termination, whereas Harris was only threatened with a possible
future termination. 4
IV. BERRY AND RiCKS SHOULD HAVE BEEN APPLIED
A. The Berry Test
Both commentators and courts have referred to the continuing tort doctrine as
one of the most perplexing and inconsistently applied theories in employment
discrimination law.'7 Therefore, in order to foster a greater understanding and more
consistent application of the doctrine, the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Berry ' adopted a three-factor test to determine when and if the continuing tort
doctrine should apply. The Berry test advises courts to examine (1) the subject
matter of the discrimination, i.e., whether all the allegations relate to gender or
racial harassment; (2) the frequency of the harassment, i.e., whether recurring, as
in a biweekly paycheck, or isolated, as in a specific work assignment or
employment decision; and (3) "degree of permanence" of the event(s) that should
trigger the employee's awareness of and duty to assert his or her rights."9 The Fifth
43. Id. at 109. The Harris court noted,"[ulntil his actual separation fromemployment, Mr. Harris
was only able to demonstrate an intent to discharge." Harris. 663 So. 2d at 95.
44. Plaintiff's Petition at 24. Indeed it is probable that Phelps specifically chose the language
it used at the associate evaluation meeting in as an attempt to avoid liability for racial discrimination.
By making it look like King chose to resign, the Firm hoped to avoid liablilty for a racially
discriminatory tennination. However, putting emotion and the issue of liability aside, the associate
evaluation meeting was an adverse employment decision (denying partnership to King for
discriminatory reasons), sufficient to trigger the running of prescription.
45. Harris. 663 So. 2d at 94.
46. For an additional policy reason, the appellate court in King noted that "the intent to terminate
Mr. Harris could easily have been annulled before the actual termination." King. 716 So. 2d at 109.
However. there is no reason to think that Phelps would alter their decision communicated to King.
47. Ramona L Paetzold & Anne M. O'Leary-Kclly. Continuing Violations and Hostile
Environment Harassment: When is Enough, Enough?. 31 Am. Bus. L. 365 (Nov. 1993).
48. Berry v. Board of Supervisors of LS.U., 715 F.2d 971 (Sth Cir. 1983).
49. id. at 981. The plaintiff in Berry was a female associate professor at Louisiana State
University. On October 14. 1976, LSU notified Bery that her contract would not be renewed upon its
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Circuit, and all other jurisdictions that adopted the test, have placed the most
weight on the final factor, the degree of permanence.-s Thus, even if a court agrees
that the first two factors have been met, if any of the alleged conduct is sufficient
to put a reasonable person on notice of the discrimination, the continuing tort
doctrine should not be applied.
The significance of this test is that a specific event will prohibit the use of the
continuing tort doctrine. For example, if an employee faces a continuously hostile
work environment but, during that period, there are one or more specific acts of
discrimination which the employee recognizes as such, the Berry test would require
the employee to bring suit within a year of the act, even if the employee is still
working for the employer."' This test is necessary within the employment context
where it is beneficial to have clear-cut rules. First the employer, himself, may not
be aware of the discrimination if it is perpetrated by other employees in a
managerial role. Thus, requiring an employee to bring suit once a salient event has
occurred could possibly allow employers to remedy the situation more quickly.
Additionally, there is a problem from an evidentiary standpoint if an employee
waits to file suit until he can no longer work in such an environment. This problem
results because many instances of the alleged discriminatory conduct may have
occurred long before the suit was filed. Other co-workers who may have witnessed
such acts may no longer work there, and the alleged victim may no longer clearly
remember the specific details of the alleged discrimination. A strict rule which
requires that an employee immediately assert his or her rights may encourage both
employers and employees to maintain a suitable working environment.5 2
expiration on May 21, 1977. Berry alleges that she was let go because of her inability to teach
extramural classes for pay as her male colleagues did. Berry filed a Tide VII claim with the EEOC on
October 12. 1977, alleging that workload and salary discrimination continued from the time she was
notified that her contract would not be renewed until her final day of employment in May. Thus, she
claimed her suit was timely. The court disagreed, holding that Berry did not file the EEOC charge
within 180 days of the alleged "unlawful employment practice." Here, the court said the notice that she
would not be rehired was a salient event which put Ms. Berry on notice of the alleged discrimination.
50. Miller v. Shawmut Bank of Boston. N.A., 726 F. Supp. 337 (D. Mass. 1989). Using the Berry
test, the court said that "the continuing violation theory is most appropriate when there is no single act
of discrimination sufficient to trigger running of prescription." In this case. continual denials of
promotion gave rise to a new claim each time, so that the plaintiff could not use the continuing violation
theory. See also Sabree v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners Local No. 33, 921 F.2d 396,
402 (Ist Cir. 1990) (defining permanence as "basically an inquiry into what... (an employee] knew
or should have known at the time of the discriminatory act"); Speer v. Rand McNally & Co.. 123 F.3d
658 (7th Cir. 1997) (using the Berry test, the continuing violation theory was not applied where the
plaintiff knew the nature of the discriminatory acts because the "permanence" factor was not met); Van
Zant v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 80 F.3d 708 (2d Cir. 1996) (using the permanence factor in the
Berry test, prescription begins when the claimant has notice of the allegedly discriminatory action).
51. Berry,715F.2dat9gl.
52. This is not to say that employees must immediately rush to sue their employers at the first
occurence of conduct that has the slightest hint of discrimination. Rather, if an employee suspects the
employer is discriminating against him or her, the employee should first try to approach the employer
and find a way to redress the conduct through internal office procedures. Then, if the conduct is not
abated or the parties cannot reach an agreement, the employee must timely assert his or her rights
accdrding to the Berry standard.
2o00
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B. Application of the Berry Test
The most recent case applying the Berry test, and frequently cited by the
defendant Phelps Dunbar, L.L.P. in its brief to the Louisiana Supreme Court," is
Webb v. Cardiothoratic Surgery Associates of North Texas."4 In Webb, the
plaintiff alleged a continuing pattern of sexual harassment, which began in the
spring of 1991 and lasted until her final day of employment in June of 1995. The
plaintiff filed suit in July 1995. Using the Berry test, the court focused on alleged
acts in 1993 where the plaintiff's supervisor improperly touched her while making
repeated sexual comments. The court held that these acts had a sufficient degree
of permanence to put the plaintiff on notice that she was the victim of sexual
harassment. In fact, in the plaintiff's own deposition, she admitted that at the time
of the 1993 conduct she believed the acts to be sexual harassment. 55 Consequently,
even though the alleged discrimination did in fact continue over the remaining
course of her employment, the plaintiff had a duty to assert her rights when she
initially recognized the harassment. She could not rely on the continuing violation
exception.
The King court does not even mention the Berry test. The application of the
Berry factors to the facts in the King case would have indicated that the continuing
tort doctrine was not appropriate. Taking the facts alleged in the petition as true,
the factor which requires the discrimination to be of the same subject matter is
clearly met. While the frequency factor is ambiguous based on the petition, King
could argue that in a hostile environment claim, the ongoing presence of the
employee in the hostile environment means that the harassment is an everyday
occurrence. Usually, however, there must be a more concrete allegation of how
often the discriminatory acts occurred.56 Nevertheless, considering that courts do
not place a great amount of emphasis on this factor," King's allegations of a
continual diminishment of work assignments would probably suffice.
It is the third and most important factor where King's claim falls short.58 As
previously discussed, the denial of partnership at the associate evaluation meeting
and the statement that King should seek a career change amount to a constructive
discharge. 9 Much like the plaintiff in Webb, King's deposition testimony reveals
that he understood the nature and the gravity of what had transpired. His
perception, and an accurate one at that, was that he was fired. Therefore, if his
termination resulted from his refusal to be the Firm's "black face," he should have
53. Original Brief to the Louisiana Supreme Court on Behalf of Defendants/Respondents at 16,
17, King v. Phelps Dunbar, LLP., 743 So. 2d ISI (La. 1999) (No. 98-C-1805).
54. 139 F.3d 532 (5th Cir. 1998).
55. Id. at 538.
56. Berry 715 F.2d at 981.
57. Robert J. Reid, Confusion in the Sixth Circuit: The Application ofthe Continuing Violation
Doctrine to Employment Discrimination, 60 U. Cin. L Rev. 1335, 1341 (1992).
58. Id.
59. See Plummer v. Marriott Corp., 654 So. 2d 843 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995).
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known at that time that a cause of action for racial discrimination had accrued,
especially since he is a lawyer.' In any event, the Louisiana Supreme Court chose
not to apply the Berry test in arriving at its conclusion that King's claim stated a
continuing tort.
C. The Ricks Standard
The King court did discuss, and then quickly dismiss, the applicability of
Delaware State College v. Ricks.6' In that case, the United States Supreme Court
decided when prescription commences under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.62 Title VII requires claimants to "file a charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within one hundred eighty days after the alleged
unlawful employment practice occurred." '63 In Ricks, the defendant college denied
tenure to the plaintiff on June 26, 1974. On the same day, he was given a one-year
terminal contract notifying him that his last day of employment with the college
would be June 26, 1975. The plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC on April 4,
1975, alleging that the college denied his tenure application and intended to
terminate his employment for racially discriminatory reasons. The college moved
to dismiss the claim because it had not been filed within 180 days of the denial of
tenure and the offer of the one-year terminal contract. The Supreme Court agreed
with the college and found that the date of notification of an adverse employment
action begins the limitations period. The Court noted, "[M]ere continuity of
employment, without more, is insufficient to prolong the life of a cause of action
for employment discrimination."" Therefore, the limitations period began to run
on June 26, 1974, and the plaintiff could not rely on the continuing violation
doctrine.
Ricks should apply to King's claim, as well. The denial of partnership and
advisement that he needed to seek a career change were definitely adverse
employment actions. These actions were a sufficient notification of termination.
Like the plaintiff in Ricks, King was not forced out of the office on that very day.
However, King should not be able to capitalize on the Firm's offer of a "grace
period."6
60. The Defendant's Opposition to Application for Supervisory Writs From the Court of Appeal,
Fourth Circuit at 13, King v. Phelps Dunbar, LLP., 743 So. 2d 181 (La. 1999) (No. 97-CA-2519)
states that "King, an attorney, was clearly on notice by January 20, 1995, that he (I) had allegedly been
subjected to a racially hostile work environment; (2) had lost status and income, (3) had suffered mental
anguish, (4) had been told at a formal evaluation that he should make a career change and leave Phelps,
which he perceived as a tenination. Any one of these facts, and certainly the compilation of these
events, should have alerted King, who is not an average lay person, to act to protect his rights."
61. 449 U.S. 250. 101 S.Ct. 498 (1980).
62. 42 U.S.C. §2000(eX1994).
63. Id.
64. Ricks, 449 U.S. at 257, 101 S. Ct. at 504.
65. The Supreme Court noted that "a final day of employment rule might discourage colleges
even from offering a grace period such as Delaware State's practice of one.year terminal contracts." Id.
at 260, 101 S. Ct at 505.
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D. Application of Berry and Ricks to King
Considering that both the Ricks date of notification standard" and the Berry
test have been uniformly applied in employment discrimination cases to prevent
plaintiffs from utilizing the continuing tort/violation doctrine, the Louisiana
Supreme Court had to find a way to maneuver around those decisions in order to
hold that King's claim was a continuing tort. While the majority merely sidesteps
the issue, Justice Kimball's concurrence reasons:
"[t]he point was not that when Ricks was denied tenure he knew his days
were numbered. The point was that the denial of tenure was an adverse
personnel decision forbidden if done for discriminatory reasons ......
... Here, there was no allegation that an adverse personnel action was
taken against King in January 1995; he later voluntarily resigned,
evidently with the encouragement of the defendants, but apparently
without any definitive personnel decision having been made.67
This statement is erroneous in two respects. First, while King's petition may
not have used the exact language "adverse personnel decision," the facts alleged
comport with the definition of the term. The U.S. Fifth Circuit recently held that:
[uinder Title VII, an adverse employment action can be defined as a
discharge, a demotion, refusal to hire, refusal to promote, reprimand or
acts of sabotage... by an employer for the purpose of establishing cause
for discharge. Thus the phrase adverse employment action is limited to
ultimate employment decisions."
Here, the decision to deny partnership is equivalent to a failure to promote. The
partners' statement that King needed to seek a career change indicates that the Firm
considered its actions towards King to be an ultimate employment decision. King's
subjective interpretation that he was fired at the associate evaluation meeting
reinforces that conclusion. Justice Kimball's statement that King did not allege that
the Firm made an adverse personnel action can only apply then to the literal
language of the petition. For it is not difficult to see that King, in fact, did allege
an adverse employment action. The failure to use the phrase is possibly because
King's attorneys knew that if they labeled the January meeting as an adverse
66. Davldson v. Indiana-American Water Works. 953 F.2d 1058 (7th Cir. 1992) held that
limitations began the day that the employee was transferred (adverse employment action) and not the
day when the full consequences were felt. See also Economu v. Borg-Warner Corp.. 829 F.2d 311 , 315
(2d Cir. 1987) (holding that the limitations period begins in a constructive discharge claim under the
ADEA when the defendants had "established their official position and made that position apparent to
plaintiff"). In both these cases, the courts heavily relied on Ricks.
67. King v. Phelps Dunbar. LLP., 743 So. 2d 181, 191 (La. 1999) (Kimball. J., concurring)
(quoting Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.. 920 F.2d 446.449 (7th Cir. 1990).
68. Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 P.3d 702 (5th Cir. 1997); see also Sharp v. City of
Houston. 164 F.3d 923 (5th Cir. 1999).
[Vol. 60
employment action, it would be impossible to avoid the application of Ricks0 and
Berry.7
0
There is a more reasonable interpretation of Justice Kimball's statement that
there was no "definitive" personnel decision. Ricks may be distinguishable because
the denial of tenure and the one-year terminal contract had finality, whereas King's
January meeting lacked that same characteristic because it did not designate a
definite last day of employment. However, the United States Supreme Court
rejected that distinction less than a year after Ricks in Chardon v. Fernandez.71 In
that case, non-tenured administrators were notified that they would either be
terminated or demoted. The administrators argued that Ricks did not apply to their
situation because the decision to terminate was revocable and incomplete until the
action was finalized; therefore, the inevitable consequence of termination was not
present. The Supreme Court disagreed, however, reiterating that limitations began
when the administrators received notice of the allegedly unlawful employment
decision. A commentator noted that the result of the Supreme Court's decision in
Chardon is that: "[a]n employer's attempt to mitigate the harsh effects of
termination will not establish a new beginning date for the charge-filing period. An
employee's optimistic hope of being rehired does not create a continuing
violation.""2 Justice Kimball's argument then is factually incorrect when she states
that there was no allegation of an adverse employment action, and legally, it is
irrelevant if the adverse employment action was not definitive.
V. KING's CLAIM FOR CoNSTRUIvE DISCHARGE
Justice Knoll's dissent recognizes that King's claim is essentially one for
constructive discharge." A constructive discharge can be found where the
imposition of an unreasonable or unpleasant work environment rises to such a level
that a reasonable person in the employee's shoes would feel compelled to resign.74
Nevertheless, "the employee's employment is not actually terminated by the
employer." Because of the inherent subjective nature of constructive discharge
cases, courts are reluctant to apply the continuing tort doctrine to such claims.
Otherwise, plaintiffs would have the choice of deciding when prescription began
based upon when the environment became too unbearable, despite the fact that
there may be objective, defining moments.
In Davis v. Hibernia National Bank," the plaintiff claimed that her
constructive discharge was the last event in a series of continuing violations. She
69. 449 U.S. 250. 101 S. Ct. 498 (1980).
70. 715F.2d971 (5thCir. 1983).
71. 454U.S.6. 102S.Ct.28(1981).
72. Emily Hitchcock, Coherence Out of Chaos: Interpreting Section 706(e) of Title VII, 33
Emory LJ. 1027. 1038 (1984).
73. King v. Phelps Dunbar, LLP., 743 So. 2d 181. 193 (La. 1999) (Knoll, J., dissenting).
74. Plummer v. Marriott Corp.. 654 So. 2d 843 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995).
75. King v. Dunbar [sic), 716 So. 2d 104, 110 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1998).
76. 732 So. 2d 61 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1999).
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had applied for various promotions throughout her career at the bank from 1982-
1993, all of which the bank denied for allegedly discriminatory reasons. The
plaintiff felt compelled to resign in 1993 because the bank allegedly had stifled her
career. In refusing to apply the continuing tort doctrine to her constructive
discharge claim, the court upheld the defendant's exception of prescription. The
court reasoned that each promotion denial was a distinct act of discrimination, and
should have alerted the plaintiff to assert her rights. Because the last promotion
plaintiff had applied for was more than a year before she filed suit, the plaintiff's
claim had prescribed even though she filed suit within a year from her resignation.
Donald v. Benson Motor Co., Inc." is one of the fewproper applications of the
continuing tort doctrine to a constructive discharge case. There, the plaintiff
alleged that his co-workers had repeatedly harassed him because of his race.
Specifically, ' the plaintiff detailed how he was a given a watermelon for his
birthday instead of a cake, that he was the subject of an effigy hung from the
ceiling with a noose tied around its neck, and that he was also the subject of racial
slurs and jokes on a consistent basis. This increasingly intensive hostile work
environment forced the plaintiff to resign on June 7, 1996. The court allowed the
plaintiff to rely on the continuing tort doctrine because "there were numerous and
continuing acts of discrimination occurring up until he left Benson's
employment." '
In King's case, a reasonable person would have felt pressured and compelled
to resign no later than January 20, 1995. King felt that his denials to the Firm's
requests to transfer to the tort and insurance section caused the Firm to withhold
work assignments, in a discriminatory fashion, even before his associate evaluation
meeting. If so, then the addition of this belief to King's perception of the meeting
where he was told (1) he had no future, (2) he would not make partner, and (3) he
needed to consider a career change, would inevitably lead a reasonable person to
feel that he must resign.79 However, King argues that the situation did not become
too intolerable for him until March 10, 1995, when he tendered his resignation. He
therefore asks the Louisiana Supreme Court to let him dictate that prescription
commenced on March 24, 1995, his final day of employment. The majority
improperly allowed him to do so, ignoring Justice Knoll's warning that the effect
would be that "prescription in constructive discharge cases will never commence
until the employee, no matter how unreasonable the decision may be, decides to
quit, making subjective continuing torts imprescriptible despite the presence of
defining events that belie that position.s'
Absent the associate evaluation meeting, King's argument would have more
merit since it would be without a "defining event." For instance, King alleges that
after he rejected each of the Firm's requests for him to transfer, the firm environ-
ment became increasingly hostile, e.g. unwarranted criticism of his professional
77. No. 97-1734, 1998 WL 387715 (E.D. La. Jul. 9, 1998).
78. Id. at $4.
79. Original Brief of Defendant/Respondents to the Louisiana Supreme Court at 18, King v.
Phelps Dunbar, L.LP, 743 So. 2d 801 (La. 1999) (No. 98-C-I 805).
80. King v. Phelps Dunbar, L.LP., 743 So. 2d 181,193 (La. 1999) (Knoll, J.. dissenting).
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competence and diminished work assignments. If this behavior continued on a
regular basis to such an extent that King felt his career had been stifled because of
the firm's discriminatory conduct, King may have felt compelled to resign. Such
a situation would be a constructive discharge. Under this set of facts, if the Firm's
conduct resulted from King's refusal to act as its "black face," King would have
a discrimination claim against the Firm Therefore, without the associate meeting,
the Firm would not have presented King with a specific event of discrimination,
and as such, King may have been able to rely on the continuing tort doctrine in a
constructive discharge claim.
VI. RAMIFICATIONS OF THE KING DECISION
In all employment discrimination cases, tension exists between the policy of
promoting an injured employee's ability to be made whole and the competing
policy of freeing employers from the burden of litigating stale claims. Recognizing
these competing policies, courts have been strict in delineating between an
employer's continuing violation and the continuing effects felt by employees.
It can be argued that requiring an employee to bring suit as soon as he realizes
that his employer violated his rights can create an awkward working environment.
First, if an employee files suit against his employer while still employed, there may
be negative repercussions in the sense of employer hostility or decreased employee
effectiveness."' Additionally, an employer may opt to change his or her decision
to fire or not promote an employee; thus, it can be argued that suit upon notice of
an employer's decision would negate any possibility that a change could occur.82
The Harris court had an additional apprehension that:
a claimant's cause of action may very well be undermined, if not
completely thwarted, by a wily employer who misleads the claimant into
believing that ameliorative measures may be taken within a year of
notification to prevent a termination and then does nothing to annul the
decision to terminate.
The situation that the Harris court contemplates, however, constitutes fraud, or at
the least some form of misrepresentation. Under an estoppel or detrimental
reliance theory, an employee should be able to recover from the employer under
such circumstances despite the fact that the prescriptive period under a date of
notification standard may have prevented a mere discrimination claim. Without
such fraud or deceit, however, employees can not be relieved from their duty to
bring suit once it is recognized that the employer violated his or her rights."
81. Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250,255, 101 S. Ct. 498, 502 (1980).
82. id.
83. Harris v. Home Savings & Loan, 663 So. 2d 92, 95-98 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1995).
84. The key to this analysis is that the employee must recognize that his or her rights have been
violated. This is in contrast to situations where the continuing tort doctrine can be applied. The
Bustanento court noted that the doctrine is appropriate in situations where, "it would be most difficult
to pin-point the specific moment in time when such conduct became sufficiently outrageous ... to
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The language of La. R.S. 23:1006 contemplates such suits during the tenure
of employment."5 Noting that the term "unlawful employment practice" includes
more than the hiring and terminating of employees,.Louisiana courts have held that
the statute allows the initiation of suits for claims resulting from mere unfavorable
evaluations." Thus, the statute is meant to cover all potentially adverse situations
that could arise in an employment relationship. The legislature obviously
considered the need to protect employers from facing a "perpetual limbo!"" in
which employees could file suit for actions occurring throughout their entire period
of employment.
The United States Supreme Court has echoed the rationale that an employee
cannot sit on his or her rights and wait for the most opportune time to assert them.
The Court has consistently held that once there is an adverse employment decision,
employees are required to take the necessary action in response.88 Specifically in
regards to the continuing tort/violation doctrine, the Court is aware that employers:
need guidance on the parameters of the doctrine, for it is very easy for
employees who sue their employers to throw in the case every bad thing
done to them during the entire tenure of their employment. Thus, courts
should look hard at the nature of the conduct alleged to have occurred and
if any of the allegations are serious and permanent, the employer should
be able to convince the court that they put the employee on notice of the
need to file a charge at the time rather than waiting to claim a continuing
violation. 9
Such a statement supports minimal use of the continuing violation doctrine only in
cases which clearly warrant such equitable tolling since the doctrine is inherently
fact-specific in nature and often hard to predict.
Law firms face a specific challenge in trying to determine the applicability of
the continuing tort doctrine in their employment arena. Firms would like to think
that in a fact-specific inquiry, courts would give due weight to the fact that it is an
become actionable and thus to commence the running of prescription." 607 So. 2d 532,538 (La.1992).
85. See La. R.S. 23:301 (Supp. 1998).
86. Boze v. Branstetter, 912 F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1990).
87. Original Brief of Defendants/Respondents to the Louisiana Supreme Court at 19, King v.
Phelps Dunbar, LLP., 743 So. 2d 181 (La. 1999) (No. 98-C-1805).
88. Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 109 S. Ct. 2261(1989), held that as soon
as a discriminatory policy goes into effect, employees must challenge it even though injury is only
speculative; the continuing violation doctrine shall not be applied just because a discriminatory policy
is continually in effect. See Leon Friedman, Employment Discrimination Law Under the New Supreme
Court Majority: The Court Turns Right, ALl-ABA Video Law Review (1989). A similar analysis has
been used in the application of the continuing violation doctrine to ADEA claims. See Jim Beall, TheCharge-Filing Period of the ADEA: Accrual and Equitable Modification, 91 Mich. L Rev. 798(1993); but see. Fontelroy v. Day & Zimnermann, Inc., 83 F.3d 431 (10th Cir. 1996).
89. Hinkle, Cox, Eaton, Coffield & Hensley, P.LL.C., Tenth Circuit Restricts Use of
"Continuing Violation" Theory, New Mexico Employment Law Letter, Sept. 1997.
90. Reid, supra note 57; Ernest C. Hadley, A Guide to Federal Sector Equal Employment Law
and Practice: Continuing Violations, (Dewey Pub. 1998); Crivens. supra note I.
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NOTES
attorney who is claiming employment discrimination. This is relevant because an
attorney most likely has enough knowledge of the law and the facts of his or her
own situation to recognize when a cause of action for discrimination accrues. If,
however, courts refuse to acknowledge an attorney's skill in ascertaining
discrimination when it is in a personal context, firms will have to make their
position a little too clear.
This is to say that firms choosing to terminate an attorney will be forced not
only to deny the attorney a partnership position, but also to make the attorney clean
out his or her desk accompanied by an official escort out of the office. Such an
unambiguous termination would provide courts with a bright-line rule, yet the
policy it creates is detrimental to the employee. In King's situation, he was told
that he would not make partner at Phelps and that he should consider a career
change. However, the Firm allowed King to continue to collect a paycheck while
searching for new employment.9 The effect of the Louisiana Supreme Court's
plurality decision will be that firms may not extend a grace period within which
terminated attorneys can make necessary arrangements without feeling all of the
consequences of unemployment.
As one commentator described the continuing violation doctrine, "the purpose
is to assist unsophisticated claimants with valid claims, not to open the door for
indiscriminately lazy individuals."'" One would like to think that this statement
does not mean to encompass attorneys. That is not to say that an attorney may not,
in all cases, rely on the continuing tort doctrine, or that the law firms employing
attorneys should be immune from committing continuing torts. If a firm creates a
continuously hostile work environment, but does not commit any distinct act or
adverse employment decision which would put the attorney on notice that his or her
rights were being violated, there would be no reason not to allow reliance on the
continuing tort doctrine. Such was not the case in King however, and as a result
of the King decision, law firms will have to ensure that they put the attorney on
notice of their position in order to protect themselves from future claims.
Kelly Brechtel
91. The Supreme Court has recognized that such "advance notice of termination is a customary
and reasonable employment practice which affords an employee an opportunity to find another job."
Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6. 8. 102 S. Ct. 28, 29 (1981).
92. Hitchcock, supra note 72, at 1062.
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